Asia
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Seki Takakazu: genius of Japanese mathematics (wasan) isolated from the world.
Parallel Paths
How Asia forged the circuits of tomorrow while seeking freedom
Yesterday — The Mechanical Loom and the Calculating Soul
In 1801, in the city of Lyon, a man named Joseph Marie Jacquard perfected a machine that would change the world. His automatic loom used punch cards to control the weaving of silk. Each card contained the instructions for one row of the pattern. By stringing hundreds of cards together, the most complex designs could be reproduced without error, indefinitely.
This French invention traveled. It crossed borders, seas, empires. Twenty-five years later, on the other side of the world, a young Japanese engineer would see in it not just a weaving machine, but the promise of an entire industrial civilization.
Japan of the 1820s was a country turned inward upon itself. For more than two centuries, the Tokugawa shogunate had maintained a policy of almost total isolation — the sakoku. A few Dutch merchants were tolerated in a small enclave of Nagasaki, and through them circulated fragments of Western science. Japanese scholars called this knowledge rangaku, "Dutch learning." It was through this tiny window that glimpses of the industrial revolution transforming Europe filtered in.
In 1853, American Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Edo Bay with his "black ships." He brought cannons and an ultimatum: Japan must open to trade or suffer the consequences. The shogunate had no choice. In a few years, an entire political system collapsed. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 placed a young emperor at the head of a modernization program of unprecedented scope.
Japanese leaders understood something their Chinese and Indian counterparts would take longer to grasp: in the industrial age, a nation that cannot manufacture is a nation that cannot defend itself. The slogan "fukoku kyōhei" — "enrich the country, strengthen the army" — became Japan's national doctrine.
Sakichi Toyoda was born in 1867, a year before the Restoration, in a modest family of Shizuoka craftsmen. His mother was a weaver. Every day, he watched her work at her loom, repeating the same gestures for hours, producing fabric of uneven quality at an agonizing pace. Every thread snapped meant a defect in the fabric, wasted labor, lost income.
Toyoda dedicated his life to solving this problem. In 1896, he patented his first power loom. In 1924, after nearly three decades of improvements, he achieved his masterpiece: the Type G automatic loom. This machine did something no other loom in the world could do — it stopped automatically when a thread broke. No need for constant human monitoring. One operator could oversee dozens of machines. It was "jidoka" — automation with a human touch.
The Type G loom so impressed the British textile company Platt Brothers that they paid a hundred thousand pounds for the patent rights — a fortune at the time. With this money, Toyoda founded a new company, oriented not toward weaving but toward the future he had glimpsed: automobiles. That company would become Toyota.
Jidoka — the idea that a machine should be able to detect its own errors and stop before producing defective output — is today a fundamental principle of computer engineering. Every modern processor contains circuits that verify the integrity of its calculations, that detect failures before they propagate. Sakichi Toyoda, thinking about broken threads, had invented the ancestor of these error-checking systems.
But Japan was not alone. Across Asia, other paths were being traced.
In Bengal, land of mathematicians since Brahmagupta, British colonization had created a peculiar situation. Colonial universities trained an Indian elite in Western science, while simultaneously denying that same elite political power and economic opportunity. This tension produced generations of brilliant minds both rooted in Indian tradition and masters of European knowledge.
Srinivasa Ramanujan was born in 1887 in Erode, a small town in southern India. His family was Brahmin but poor. He showed an extraordinary gift for numbers from childhood. By fifteen, he had exhausted all available mathematics books in his region. He discovered for himself theorems that had taken European mathematicians centuries to establish.
In 1913, Ramanujan wrote a letter to G.H. Hardy, a mathematician at Cambridge University. In the envelope: nine pages filled with formulas, results, conjectures. Hardy was stunned. Some of these formulas were known. Others were completely new and seemed true, though Ramanujan offered no proofs. A few appeared false but turned out to be correct with slight modifications.
Hardy brought Ramanujan to England. In five years, the young Indian published dozens of groundbreaking articles. His work on the partition function — counting the ways to express a number as a sum of integers — would find applications eighty years later in string theory, black hole physics, and cryptographic algorithms.
Ramanujan died in 1920, at thirty-two, worn out by illness and exile. But his notebooks, filled with thousands of unproved formulas, continue to inspire mathematicians. Several of these formulas have found applications in computer science — in calculating pi, in compression algorithms, in fast series analysis.
India produced other mathematical geniuses in this period. Prasanta Chandra Mahalanobis, born in 1893, studied at Cambridge alongside Ramanujan. Returning to India, he founded the Indian Statistical Institute and developed the "Mahalanobis distance" — a statistical measure for determining whether a data point belongs to a given set. This measure is today used in machine learning, pattern recognition, and anomaly detection.
In China, the period was one of collapse. The Qing dynasty, already weakened by the Opium Wars, crumbled in 1912. Civil war, foreign invasion, internal fragmentation — decades of chaos made any sustained scientific development difficult. And yet, in this tumult, seeds were planted.
In 1936, a young Chinese mathematician named Hua Loo-Keng published his first article on number theory. He had never attended university. He had learned mathematics alone, working in a small shop in his native village. His exceptional talent attracted the attention of professors at Tsinghua University, who invited him despite his lack of a diploma.
Hua would become the founder of modern mathematics in China. After 1949, he built research institutes, trained generations of students, popularized mathematics through accessible books. His work on matrix algebra and numerical analysis would directly influence early Chinese computing.
But it is in another theater that the most dramatic Asian contribution took shape during this period — a contribution linked to war, empire, and a long struggle for independence.
Today — The Struggle and the Algorithm
India in 1930 was a land of contradictions. One of the oldest civilizations in the world, the inventor of zero and decimal numeration, found itself subjected to a tiny island at the other end of the planet. British India was a demonstration of what industrial technology could accomplish in the service of empire: railways to extract resources, telegraphs to coordinate repression, administration to control every aspect of life.
In Bombay, in a modest house, a young man named Homi Bhabha was preparing to leave for Cambridge. Born in 1909 into a wealthy Parsi family, Bhabha had dreamed of physics since childhood. His father wanted him to become an engineer. A compromise was reached: Bhabha would study engineering at Cambridge, then do as he pleased.
Cambridge of the 1930s was the center of the world in theoretical physics. Paul Dirac had just unified quantum mechanics and relativity. Rutherford's team was probing atomic structure. The great questions of the century — the nature of matter, the origin of energy, the structure of the universe — were debated in the labs and lecture halls.
Bhabha dove in with passion. His doctoral thesis, on cosmic ray absorption, earned him a fellowship. He worked alongside Bohr, Fermi, Pauli. He became a peer of the greatest physicists of his time.
In 1939, Bhabha was in India for vacation when World War II broke out. He could not return to England. What might have seemed like a disaster proved transformative. Bhabha decided to stay, to build in India what he could no longer find in Cambridge.
In 1944, with support from the Tata industrial family, he founded the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Bombay. After independence, in 1948, he became the head of India's atomic energy program. In 1955, he oversaw the construction of the country's first nuclear reactor. In 1962, he launched India's space program.
Bhabha understood that atomic energy and space research required calculating power. In 1955, he imported India's first computer — an HEC-2M manufactured in Britain. This machine, with its tubes and relays, occupied an entire room and possessed less power than a modern pocket calculator. But it was a start.
Four years later, TIFRAC (Tata Institute of Fundamental Research Automatic Calculator) was born — the first computer entirely designed and built in India. The team that created it did so almost without documentation. They wrote to the builders of ILLIAC, the American computer they were trying to emulate, received a package of technical documents, and taught themselves.
TIFRAC worked. It was slow, unreliable, often in repair. But it proved that India could build its own technological future. Bhabha liked to say that in science, "the only things worth doing are the ones people say are impossible."
In January 1966, Homi Bhabha was killed in a plane crash in the Alps. Theories abound about the cause of the accident — some see the hand of the CIA, alarmed by India's nuclear progress. Whatever the truth, his legacy endures: the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, the Department of Atomic Energy, the Indian Space Research Organisation, and a tradition of scientific excellence that continues to this day.
Bhabha was not alone. Indian mathematicians of this generation left their mark on what would become computer science.
In 1959, a researcher named Raj Chandra Bose, working at the University of North Carolina, published alongside two colleagues an article on error-correcting codes. The "BCH codes" (for Bose, Chaudhuri, and Hocquenghem, who discovered them independently) are among the most widely used error correction systems in the world. Every CD, DVD, Blu-ray disc, every QR code, every satellite transmission uses codes derived from their work.
Raj Bose was Indian. So was Dwijendra Kumar Ray-Chaudhuri, the second author. Together, they solved a problem that Claude Shannon had posed but not resolved: how to correct not just detect errors in transmitted data. Their solution — an algebraic construction using finite fields — is a masterpiece of mathematical elegance.
Meanwhile in Japan, defeat in 1945 was followed by an occupation that transformed the country from the ground up. The Americans dismantled the war machine but built in its place an economic infrastructure. Japanese engineers, trained in military precision, turned to civilian industry.
In 1946, an engineer named Akira Nakajima published an article on switching circuit theory. Nakajima had developed, independently and almost simultaneously with Claude Shannon, the same insight: Boolean algebra could describe electrical circuits. His work, published in Japanese and largely unknown in the West, shows that the same ideas can germinate in parallel when the soil is ready.
Japanese electronics took off in the 1950s. Sony, founded in 1946, launched the transistor radio in 1955. This pocket-sized device, dismissed by American manufacturers as a toy, conquered the global market. The Japanese understood something that others would take longer to grasp: the future of electronics lay in miniaturization.
In 1964, Japan hosted the Olympic Games in Tokyo. To ensure their success, the country undertook a vast modernization program. The Shinkansen, the first high-speed train, was inaugurated. Real-time information systems were installed. Distributed computing systems coordinated the logistics. Japan was demonstrating to the world that it had become a technological power.
In China, the period was more troubled. The communist revolution of 1949 brought with it the promise of modernization, but also campaigns that devastated the country's intellectual life. The "Hundred Flowers" movement of 1956-57 seemed to invite free criticism, then turned into a purge. Thousands of scientists, engineers, and professors were sent to labor camps.
And yet, in this chaos, some projects survived. In 1958, the Model 103 — China's first computer — was completed. Two years later, the Model 104, entirely Chinese-designed, followed. The machines were rudimentary, based on Soviet technology, but they worked. A Chinese computing tradition was taking root.
The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) would destroy much of this progress. Universities were closed. Professors were humiliated. Students were sent to the countryside to "learn from the peasants." A generation of Chinese scientists lost a decade of their careers. The consequences can still be felt today.
But there was one exception. China's atomic and space programs, protected by Mao himself, continued during the Cultural Revolution. In 1964, China detonated its first atomic bomb. In 1967, its first hydrogen bomb. In 1970, its first satellite. These achievements required considerable computational capacity. The engineers who designed them, often working in isolation, developed their own methods, their own algorithms, their own machines.
Beyond — Convergent Paths
The history of computing in Asia during this period is a story of parallel paths. Japan, India, China — each followed its own trajectory, shaped by its own history, its own constraints, its own aspirations. And yet these paths converge on common points.
First, the relationship to the West. All three countries had to position themselves relative to American and European technology. Japan chose adoption and improvement: take foreign technologies, study them, perfect them, surpass them. India chose adaptation: build on Western foundations, but with local resources and for local objectives. China oscillated between imitation and isolation, importing Soviet technology then trying to free itself from any dependency.
Second, the link between computing and sovereignty. In all three countries, calculating machines were perceived as instruments of national power. Building a computer was not just a technical achievement — it was a political statement. It said: we can do it ourselves. We are not dependent on anyone.
This motivation explains why Asian pioneers often worked with limited resources, in difficult conditions, against considerable obstacles. They were not just solving technical problems. They were building the independence of their nations.
Third, the mathematical heritage. India, China, Japan — all possessed ancient mathematical traditions that predated European influence. These traditions did not disappear with colonization or modernization. They continued to shape the way Asian researchers approached problems, to inform their intuitions, to guide their choices.
Ramanujan, who had never learned mathematics in the European style, produced results that European mathematicians could barely understand. Hua Loo-Keng, self-taught, developed original methods in number theory. Japanese engineers, trained in a culture of precision and error prevention, invented jidoka and kaizen. These contributions carried the mark of their origins.
The history of artificial intelligence is often told as a Western story. It begins with Leibniz, continues through Babbage and Lovelace, culminates with Turing and Shannon, branches out to the labs of MIT and Stanford. Asian contributions are mentioned in passing, if at all.
This story is not false, but it is incomplete. It ignores the threads that cross continents, the ideas that emerge in parallel, the researchers who worked in isolation and nonetheless arrived at similar conclusions.
Today, Asia has become the center of gravity of artificial intelligence. China and India train more engineers than the United States and Europe combined. Japan remains at the forefront of robotics. South Korea dominates semiconductor manufacturing. Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are emerging as innovation hubs.
This is not an accident. It is the fruit of seeds planted during the period we have traversed. Homi Bhabha, importing India's first computer. Sakichi Toyoda, inventing jidoka. Akira Nakajima, discovering switching circuit theory independently. Hua Loo-Keng, building Chinese mathematics from nothing.
These pioneers did not know they were laying the foundations of a future industry. They were simply following their curiosity, serving their countries, trying to solve the problems presented to them. History would prove them right.
The lesson of the Asian parallel paths is perhaps this: there is never only one way to arrive at an idea. The same insights can emerge at different places, at different times, in different cultures. What we call "artificial intelligence" is not the invention of a single civilization. It is the product of a convergence — a convergence of paths that were traced in parallel, across oceans and centuries, until they finally met.
Today, these paths have merged. The algorithms running in Tokyo or Beijing data centers are not fundamentally different from those running in San Francisco or London. Artificial intelligence has become universal — at least in its technical form.
But the diversity of paths that led here has not disappeared. It persists in the approaches, priorities, values that different nations bring to AI. It persists in the questions they ask and those they leave aside. It persists in the visions of the future they construct.
The artificial intelligence of tomorrow will not be built by a single civilization. It will be built by all of them together — each contributing its own heritage, its own traditions, its own perspective. The parallel paths will continue to converge, branch off, intertwine.
And perhaps this is the best guarantee we have. An intelligence forged by all of humanity has a better chance of serving all of humanity. A technology born of diversity has a better chance of respecting diversity.
The Asia of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries understood something essential: sovereignty passes through science, and science passes through calculation. The algorithms they developed, the machines they built, the institutions they founded — all of this was in service of a single objective: to exist as free peoples in a world where technology determines power.
This lesson remains valid today. Artificial intelligence is a matter of power. How it is developed, by whom, and for whom — these questions will shape the century to come. The parallel paths continue. The choice remains ours.